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U.S. Official Forecasts of Group of Seven Economic
Performance, 1976-90
Michael Ulan, William G. Dewald and James B. Bullard
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the
accuracy of the U.S. official forecasts of real growth
and inflation from 1976 to 1990 for the Group of Seven
(G—7) economies: Canada, France, Germany, Japan,
Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.’ The
accuracy of these forecasts is measured against the
standard of actual real growth and inflation as
subsequently published in the Treasury’s World
Economic Outlook (WEO). The Administration forecasts
and their accuracy are evaluated against a number of
alternative forecasts.2 The primary comparison is to
projections made by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) for each of the G-7
nations. For Canada and the United States, we also
compare the Administration forecasts to those made by
Data Resources, Incorporated (DRI), and for the United
‘ Though widely distributed within the
government, the Administration forecasts have been
classified and not available to the public. We
obtained the forecasts for years through 1990 under a
Freedom of Information Act request with the helpful
cooperation of the Treasury Department.
2 The data are described in Appendix A and are
available from the authors on request.
1States only, we compare the Administration forecasts
to those made by the Blue Chip consensus and the U.S.
Federal Reserve “Greenbook.”3 For each country and
for the G-7 nations taken as a whole, the outlooks are
evaluated on the basis of the differences between
predictions and outcomes. The predictions and
outcomes are expressed in terms of year-over-year
percentage changes. The statistics cited are the sum
of squared errors, the mean squared errors, the root
mean squared errors (RMSE) and the bias (sum of
prediction minus outcome). We think these measures
provide a simple but effective method of evaluating
forecast accuracy.
THE ADMINISTRATION FORECASTS
Administration Real Growth Forecasts
The errors in the Administration forecasts of
GNP/GDP growth in the G-7 nations are shown in
figure 1. The summary statistics relating to the
errors in these forecasts appear in table 1.
The sum of squared errors of the
Administration’s growth forecasts for Japan, the
United States, Canada and West Germany are significant
&- the 1 percent error level as is the G-7 total.
Just under half of the forecast errors were of a
different sign from the errors of the preceding year.
~ The Federal Reserve “Greenbook” is a document
distributed to top level staff and Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) members shortly before each FOMC
meeting. The FOMC is the primary policymaking arm of
the Federal Reserve. Greenbook information is
classified for five years following each FOMC meeting.
2The number of sign reversals of forecast error ranged
from four for Japan to nine for Canada.4
As was true for other forecasters, the
Administration simply missed the deep recessions in
1982 in the United States and Canada. The
Administration forecasted 1.5 percent real growth for
the United States in 1982 and 0.2 percent for Canada.
The outcome was a 3.8 percent decrease in output in
the United States and a 7.8 percent decrease in
Canada, one of the deepest recessions in either
country since the end of World War II. In absolute
terms the 1982 forecast errors for U.S. and Canadian
economic growth were two to three times as large as
any for a non-North-American G-7 economy over the 15
years covered here.5 While output fell in some other
G-7 economies in 1982, no other nation experienced
such a reversal of fortunes.
There were some large declines in real growth in
other countries in other years too. Italy experienced
a 4.2 percent fall in its output between 1980 and
1981; the United Kingdom, a 4.3 percent decline
between 1979 and 1980; but Administration forecasts in
these instances were not so wide of the mark as for
~A zero error is not counted as a change in
sign. Counting a zero error as a change in sign, the
fraction of sign changes increases to just over half,
and the range across countries runs from six (Japan
and West Germany) to nine (Canada).
~ The largest forecast errors (in percentage
points) for each nation were:
United States 1982 5.3 Canada 1982 7.6
Japan 1988 -2.7 France 1989 -2.0
West Germany 1989 —2.5 Italy 1976 —2.7
United Kingdom 1977 2.1
3the U.S. and Canadian forecasts for 1982. Moreover,
the error in the Administration’s forecasts of growth
in Italy and the United Kingdom was larger in non-
turning-point years than during these turning-point
episodes. In the case of Italy, the largest error was
for 1976, when the nation’s economy experienced a
substantial upturn. Although the 1976 change in
direction of the Italian economy (a total of 9.3
percentage points—from a decline of 3.7 percent in
1975 to growth of 5.6 percent in 1976) was greater
than the percentage-point changes in the direction of
output change in the U.S. and Canadian economies in
1982, the error in the Administration forecast of
Italian GDP growth in 1976 was only -2.7 percentage
points.
Administration Inflation Forecasts
The Administration forecast errors for inflation
in the G-7 nations are shown in figure 2;6 table 2
presents the summary statistics with respect to the
6 The large error in the forecast of U.K.
inflation in 1978 is attributable primarily to a
decline in inflation in 1978; inflation fell from 15.9
percent in 1977 to 8.3 percent in 1978. It rose to
13.4 percent in 1979. During 1978, there were price
controls in force on some components of the CPI market
basket, and, at government urging, unions moderated
their wage demands. In 1979, with the election of a
Conservative government, the unions returned to no-
holds-barred wage bargaining, and the government not
only removed price controls, it increased the rate of
value-added tax applicable to several items in the CPI
market basket, boosting inflation during that year.
4errors in the Administration forecasts of inflation in
the G-7 nations from 1976 through l990.~
The table reveals that the Administration tended
to underpredict inflation in Italy and the United
Kingdom, countries with high average inflation rates
and to overpredict inflation in the United States,
Germany, and, particularly, Japan, countries with
comparatively low inflation.8 Errors in one direction
were followed by errors in the other direction about a
third of the time—less than was the case for real
growth. The number of reversals of sign of the
forecast error ranged from three for Japan to six for
both France and the United Kingdom.9
We have looked at whether the Administration
forecasting record was better when growth and
inflation were rising than when they were falling.’0
11
‘ The Administration forecasts of U.S. inflation
in 1979 and 1980 pertained to the GNP deflator rather
than the CPI. Hence, for these two years, the
forecast errors are calculated with respect to the
change in that measure rather than the CPI.
~ Japan’s compounded annual rate of inflation
between 1976 and 1990 was 3.1 percent, second among
the G-7 nations to West Germany’s 3.0 percent.
~ Once again, a zero erràr is not counted as a
change in sign. If an accurate prediction were
counted as a sign change, Canada would join the United
Kingdom and France with six year-to-year sign changes.
~ Note that the focus here is on whether the
growth or inflation rate is algebraically greater than
or less than that during the previous year. Thus, a
change in a growth or inflation rate from a positive
number to a smaller positive number is counted as a
fall in the rate while a change from a negative number
to a smaller negative number is counted as a rise in
the rate.
5The RNSE of the Administration’s forecasts of economic
growth in the G-7 nations taken as a whole was more
than one third larger for the periods when growth fell
than when it rose. In contrast, the RNSE of the
Administration’s inflation forecasts for the G-7
nations taken together was lower when inflation was
falling than when it was rising.
COMPARISONS TO ALTERNATIVE PREDICTIONS
Administration and OECD Predictions, 1977-90
OECD’s projections of economic growth for G-7
nations’2 between 1977 and 1990 are readily available
for comparison with the Administration predictions.’3
“ There were two cases in which economic growth
was unchanged from the previous year. West German
economic growth in 1986 was 2.5 percent, equal to the
1985 figure; U.K. growth in 1988 was 4.2 percent,
equal to the 1987 number. There was also one instance
of an unchanged inflation rate. The U.S. inflation
rate in 1977 was 5.8 percent, equal to the 1976 rate.
These observations have been deleted from the analysis
of “up versus down” forecasting errors.
12 DRI forecasts of economic growth and inflation
for all the G-7 countries are available over the
period 1983-90. The summary statistics pertaining to
these DRI forecasts are compared to those of the
Administration’s forecasts over the same period in the
appendix. Generally the DRI forecasts over this
evaluation period were somewhat more accurate than the
Administration forecasts.
13 The OECD makes several assumptions about
members’ economies in projecting each nation’s
economic growth. The organization assumes that the
exchange rate of the nation’s currency during a year
remains at the level of November in the previous year
(the month the projections are prepared), that fiscal
policy will remain unchanged and that the real oil
price (the price of oil relative to that of OECD
exports of manufactures) will remain constant. The
reasoning behind these assumptions is that the OECD is
“advising” its member governments where they are
headed economically if they continue to pursue current
policies—not predicting the nations’ economic futures.
Hence, the OECD considers its product a projection
6The OECD staff issues its projections in the Economic
Outlook twice each year—around mid—year and in
December. We compared the December OECD projections
(prepared in mid-November) with Administration
forecasts although the latter were generally made
earlier. Summary statistics covering the
Administration’s predictions and OECD projections over
1977-90 appear in table 3.
To what might one attribute the greater accuracy
of the OECD outlooks compared with the
Administration’s forecasts? One factor might be that
OECD projections of growth in the G-7 nations were
made closer to the beginning of the forecast year.
The OECD might also be in a better position in closely
following the economic performance of many nations to
take into account worldwide influences than is the
Administration whose forecasts are largely dependent
on inputs from individual countries. On the other
hand, the OECD procedure simply assumes unchanged
fiscal policies, exchange rates and real oil prices,
which might be a factor that would lead to less
accuracy in their predictions if it were true that
such factors have a predictable effect on growth and
inflation. In sum, we don’t have an explanation for
the difference.
In any event, for each G-7 nation except Italy,
the sum of squared errors of the OECD projection is
smaller than that for the Administration forecast
errors. Moreover, while the Administration’s squared
rather than a forecast.
7forecast errors of U.S. and German economic growth are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, the
squared errors in the OECD projections for these two
nations are not significant at even the 5 percent
level. The errors in the Administration predictions
of Japanese growth are significant at the 5 percent
level; those in the OECD projections are not. In the
case of Italy, the errors in the OECD projection are
significant at the 5 percent level, but those in the
Administration forecast are not. The errors
concerning Canadian economic growth by both the
Administration and the OECD are significant at the 1
percent level. The errors with regard to U.K. and
French economic growth by both groups are not
significant at the 5 percent level. For the G-7 as a
whole, the sums of squared errors of both the
Administration forecasts and OECD projections are
significant at the 1 percent level.
Both the Administration forecasts and the OECD
projections were biased—but in opposite directions.
The Administration growth forecasts for six of the
seven nations and in total are biased
upward—substantially for U.S. and Canadian forecasts.
In contrast, except for Canadian growth, the OECD~
projections are biased downward—substantially in the
cases of the United States, Italy and the United
Kingdom.’4
14 Peter Jarrett of the OECD’s U.S. desk offered
two explanations of the overall downward bias of the
organization’s projections: (1) The period covered by
this study has generally been marked by economic
expansion in the G-7 nations, and its failure to
8Since one large error can mar an otherwise good
performance, we also examined errors with the largest
error omitted.’5 The statistical results are
presented in table 4.
With one observation deleted, the errors in both
the Administration and OECD forecasts for U.S. growth
are not only very close but also insignificant at the
5 percent level. As for the full set of errors, the
Administration forecasts were biased positively; OECD
projections the opposite. The widest gaps between
Administration and OECD forecasting accuracy were for
Germany and Japan with OECD projections being the more
accurate. As for the full set of forecasts, the
Administration’s forecasts of Italian real growth with
foresee downturns that could tend to introduce serious
upward bias to the OECD projections; and (2) The
projections are based, in part, on the assumption of
unchanged (general government) fiscal policies. Mr.
Jarrett asserted that, since 1977, G-7 fiscal deficits
have tended to grow, imparting a short-term boost to
national growth rates.
15 The omitted observations are:
Administration
United States (1982) 5.3 Canada (1982) 7.6
Japan (1988) —2.7 France (1989) —2.0
West Germany (1989) —2.5 Italy (1983) 2.3
United Kingdom (1977) 2.1
OECD
United States (1988) -1.9 Canada (1982) 5.4
Japan (1988) —2.2 France (1988) —1.9
West Germany (1982) 2.3 Italy (1980) —2.0
United Kingdom (1983) -2.3
Note: The 1984 error in the OECD projection of French
growth was the same as that in the projection of
French growth in 1984. Only one observation was
deleted, however.
9the largest error deleted were marginally more
accurate than the OECD’s.
Administration, Blue Chip, Federal Reserve and DRI
Forecasts for Canada and the United States
Real Growth—The Blue Chip Economic Indicators
consensus forecast of year—on-year real economic
growth in the United States has been published monthly
since 1976.16 The first year for which growth
forecasts were made was 1977. A consensus forecast of
year—on—year change in the U.S. Consumer Price Index
(CPI) has been published since 1979 (forecasting
1980). Though DRI forecasts for the United States are
available for the full period for which we have
Administration forecasts, we compared the three
forecasting records over only the period for which the
Blue Chip consensus has been available. Likewise, the
Federal Reserve’s “Greenbook” forecasts were available
for the entire period 1976-90, but in order to keep
the same basis for comparison, we compared the Federal
Reserve forecasts to the alternatives for only the
years in which the Blue Chip consensus was available.
As shown in table 5, the Blue Chip, DRI and the
Federal Reserve forecasts of U.S. economic growth were
all more accurate than the Administration forecasts,
with the Greenbook achieving the greatest overall
accuracy.
16 While the growth and inflation forecasts have
appeared since 1976 and 1979 respectively, both the
number and the identities of participating private
sector forecasters have changed over time.
10The Administration and DRI forecasts for
Canadian growth were very similar in every respect.
For U.S. growth, the positive bias of the
Administration forecasts was matched in magnitude only
by the negative bias of the Federal Reserve forecasts.
As noted, the exclusion of the forecast for 1982
greatly improves the accuracy of the Administration
forecasts, particularly compared with DRI. In fact,
the same observation accounted for the greatest error
in each of the forecasts except those of the Federal
Reserve. In September 1981, many forecasters
predicted positive economic growth for the U.S.
economy in 1982 even though it was already several
months into a recession that would not bottom out
until the following November. The Greenbook forecast
was considerably better, predicting —0.6 versus an
actual outcome of —1.9. Table 6 shows the effects of
omitting the largest error in computing the accuracy
of these forecasts.’7 Clearly, the Federal Reserve is
helped the least by this exclusion, and ranks last in
accuracy in table 6.
Inflation—Thrning to inflation, as shown in
table 7, in contrast to the situation with respect to
growth, the Administration was a marginally more
accurate forecaster of U.S. inflation than the Blue
Chip survey and enormously more accurate than DRI.
17 The errors in the Treasury, Blue Chip, DRI and
Federal Reserve forecasts of U.S. growth for 1982 were
5.3, 4.5, 4.3 and 1.3 percentage points, respectively.
The largest Federal Reserve error was -2.5, recorded
in 1981. The largest errors in the Treasury and DRI
forecasts of Canadian growth were 7.6 and 7.9
percentage points, respectively.
11The Federal Reserve was again the most accurate
overall for the United States. DRI predicted Canadian
inflation more accurately than the Administration.
Summary statistics with the largest forecast error
omitted are presented in table 8.18 Once again the
Administration forecasts hold up very well against
those of the other forecasters for the United States.
DRI’s inflation forecasts for Canada were more
accurate than the Administration’s though also more
biased.
SUMMARY
Comparing Administration forecasts to the Blue
Chip consensus, Federal Reserve Greenbook and DRI
predictions of growth and inflation in the U.S.
economy, one finds that the other forecasters saw the
future more accurately and less optimistically with
respect to real growth than the Administration did.
Much, though not all, of that rosy perspective was
connected with the failure of the Administration to
forecast the recession in 1982. Deleting that
observation substantially enhances measured forecast
‘~ For the U.S. inflation rate, the forecast
observations deleted from the Treasury and Blue Chip
forecasts were those pertaining to 1986, which were
2.3 and 2.1 percentage points, respectively. The
observation deleted from the DRI forecast was that for
1980, which was -3.9 percentage points. For the
Federal Reserve, the largest error was either —1.6
(1990) or 1.6 (1986). Which one is deleted is
important only for the bias measure, as noted in
table 8. For the Canadian inflation rate, the
forecast observations deleted from the Treasury and
DRI forecasts were those for 1984 and 1981,
respectively, which were 2.1 and —2.0 percentage
points.
12accuracy, reducing the RMSE to 1 percentage point or
less. Forecast errors of U.S. inflation were
generally statistically insignificant at the 5 percent
level though both the Blue Chip consensus and
Administration tended to overpredict U.S. inflation to
a substantial extent. DRI, in contrast, tended to
underpredict inflation over the 1980-90 period.
Compared to OECD projections between 1977 and
1990, the errors in the Administration’s forecasts of
economic growth for Japan, Germany and even the United
States are significantly larger than those of the OECD
projections. The errors in both sets of forecasts of
G-7 economic growth are statistically significant at
the 1 percent level. The biases in the
Administration’s forecasts tend to be positive; those
in the forecasts of U.S. and Canadian growth are
particularly large. On the whole, the biases of the
OECD projections are negative; those associated with
forecasts of U.S., Italian and U.K. growth are large.
Omitting one observation reduces both forecast errors
substantially. For the G-7 as a whole, the projection
errors of the OECD are not significant at the 5
percent level, but the Administration’s forecast
errors renv~~in statistically significant at the 1
percent level.
The differences between the forecast errors of
the Administration and the forecast (or projection)
errors of the other forecasters may arise from
differences in the times at which the forecasts or
projections were prepared, a situation that may have
influenced the quality of the historical baseline
13available to forecasters and the values of exogenous
variables assumed in predicting the future paths of
the economies. Nonetheless, so far as we can
ascertain, every forecast we have evaluated was a
genuine forecast of growth and inflation made in the
closing months of a year with respect to the next
year. By the standards that we have discussed, the
Administration forecasts have been well within the
range of the forecast errors of others.
14APPENDIX 1: Data Sources
The data used in this study come primarily from
the World Economic Outlook (WEO) prepared by the
United States Department of the Treasury, Blue Chip
Economic Indicators, DRI’s various Reviews, the OECD’s
Economic Outlook and the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook.
The Administration forecasts of G-7 nations’ economic
growth and inflation have been made since 1975. The
forecasts evaluated in this study cover 1976-90, the
last year for which forecasts have been cleared for
release to the public by the Treasury. This is also
the last year for which the Greenbook forecasts are
cleared for public release. With one major exception,
the Administration forecasts for the U.S. economy are
those of the Council of Economic Advisers.’9
Forecasts for the other G-7 economies are produced by
Treasury financial attaches at U.S. embassies in the
capitals of these nations. The attaches review the
host-government and host—country private—sector
forecasts for the economies of the nations to which
they are posted and base their own forecasts on such
information, together with their own judgments about
the national economies. The Blue Chip consensus
forecasts are the mean val” es of the forecasts of the
firms covered in the Blue Chip surveys. The DRI
forecasts are based on the outputs of the DRI models
of the U.S. and Canadian economies and the judgments
19 The Treasury thought the Council’s forecast of
U.S. economic growth in 1983 was too high and
substituted the Blue Chip consensus forecast. (As it
turned out, the Treasury—i.e., Blue Chip—forecast was
also too high, but not so high as the Council’s.)
15of that firm’s staff. The OECD projections are
prepared by members of that organization’s staff.2°
The Federal Reserve forecasts are prepared by the
staff at the Federal Reserve Board in Washington.
The Administration, Blue Chip and DRI forecasts
and the OECD outlooks have appeared several times each
year and are frequently revised. The ~Q forecasts
evaluated here are the last predictions of both growth
and inflation for the next year made during the
previous year.2’ The Blue Chip and DRI forecasts for
the U.S. and Canadian economies selected for
comparison to the Administration forecasts were those
published during the same months as the Administration
forecasts. The DRI forecasts begin with those for
1976 and run through those for 1990. DRI forecasts
for all of the other G-7 countries are available for
each year since 1983. The OECD projections are those
published in December for the next year, beginning
with the outlook for 1977.
Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) data are frequently revised. It was
necessary to choose a fixed target to which to compare
the forecasts. What we did was to use the Treasury
Department’s historical data, which it provided along
with its forecasts in each issue of the WEO.
20 The OECD focuses on year—on-year growth rates.
Since the OECD uses the personal consumption deflator
(rather than the consumer price index) as its measure
of inflation, its inflation projections are not
considered here.
21 The dates of the Administration forecasts for
the next year range from September through December of
the previous year.
16Generally, historical data on GNP or GNP changes for a
particular year continue to appear in the ~1~Qfor
about 18 months following the end of that year. The
last historical citation of the annual change in
national GNP or GDP appearing in the 3~Qis the
outcome to which the forecasts are compared.22
Although Consumer Price Index (CPI) data tend not to
be revised after they are issued, a similar procedure
has been followed in selecting the inflation data with
which to compare the forecasts. Because the Treasury
presents no historical data for growth or inflation in
1978, we have compared their forecasts for 1978 with
outcomes taken from the 1981 International Financial
Statistics (IFS) yearbook.23
22 In 1986 Canada changed the emphasis in its
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) from GNP
to GDP and stopped explicitly reporting historical
real GNP data in its official bulletin, National
Income and ExDenditure Accounts (NIEA). When the
Canadian NIPA focus shifted, the Administration began
to forecast GDP instead of GNP for Canada and reported
historical GDP data in the WEO. Since the 1985 and
1986 growth forecasts for Canada prepared b’~’ the
Administration pertained to GNP, it was necessary to
obtain real GNP growth data for 1985 and 1986 with
which to compare the forecasts.
23 The Administration’s 1980 inflation forecast
for the United States, which appeared in the September
1979 ~Q, pertained to the GNP deflator rather than
the CPI. The deflator calculated on the basis of data
appearing in the 1981 IFS yearbook was used to test
the accuracy of this forecast. (Given the
Administration data, the September 1979 DRI and Blue
Chip forecasts of the increase in the U.S. GNP
deflator—rather than CPI inflation—are employed in
this comparison.)
17APPENDIX 2: Are the Sizes of the Administration’s
Forecast Errors and Year—to—Year Changes in Forecasted
Variables Related?
In this paper we have analyzed absolute forecast
errors. Greater period—to-period movements in
variables being predicted might be associated with
greater absolute forecast errors: Presumably it takes
more skill to hit a moving target than a stationary
bull’s eye. If this be the case, it would seem
appropriate to consider the extent to which the
forecast target moves from year to year in assessing
the accuracy of the forecast: Hence, we examined the
sum of squared errors of the Administration’s
forecasts of both growth and inflation in each of the
G-7 countries normalized by the sum of squared year-
to-year changes in growth and inflation. A ratio
close to unity indicates that there is a relationship
between forecast accuracy and target—variable
volatility; a ratio far from unity (either above or
below one) indicates there is not such a relationship.
The ratios pertaining to the Administration’s
forecasts of growth and inflation in each of the G-7
countries (and for the G-7 countries taken together)
are presented in table 11.
With respect to growth forecasts, the only
country for which there appears to be a close
relationship-a ratio between, say 0.80 and
1.20—between the size of forecast errors and the
extent of change in real output from year to year is
Japan. For the G-7 taken as a whole, such a
relationship does not exist over the period under
18study here. The relationship between the size of
forecast error and the extent of period-to-period
movement in the variable being predicted is far more
frequent in the case of inflation in the G-7
countries. The relationship holds for forecasts of
inflation in Canada, France, West Germany and Italy—a
group that includes both low- and high-inflation
nations--and for the G-7 nations as a whole.
19Figure 1
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21Table 1
Errors in Administration GNP/GDP Growth Forecasts, 1976-90
Country Sum of squared errors Mean squared error RNSE Bias
United States 40.87 2.72 1.65 8.9
Canada 92.88 6.19 2.49 7.0
Japan 29.24 1.95 1.40 -1.2
France 15.71 1.05 1.02 -1.1
West Germany 38.81 2.59 1.61 —2.5
Italy 27.91 1.86 1.36 —2.3
United Kingdom 21.67 1.44 1.20 1.5
G—7 total 267.09 2.54 1.59 10.3
22Table 2
Errors in Administration Inflation Forecasts, 1976-90
Country Sum of squared errors Mean squared error RMSE Bias
United States 21.15 1.41 1.19 0.7
Canada 33.97 2.26 1.50 —2.1
Japan 22.81 1.52 1.23 10.9
France 53.81 3.59 1.89 0.5
West Germany 18.70 1.25 1.11 2.8
Italy 174.68 11.65 3.41 —20.4
United Kingdom 102.54 6.84 2.61 —9.4
G—7 total 427.66 4.07 2.02 —17.0
23Table 3
Errors in Administration and OECD Growth Forecasts, 1977-90


























































































Errors in Administration and OECD Growth Forecasts, 1977-90
(largest error omitted)


























































































Errors in U.S. and Canadian Growth Forecasts, 1977-90


































Errors in U.S. and Canadian Growth Forecasts, 1977-90
(largest error omitted)


































Errors in U.S. and Canadian Inflation Forecasts, 1980-90


































Errors in U.S. and Canadian Inflation Forecasts, 1980-90
(largest error omitted)

































* The Greenbook bias is either 2.8 or -0.4, depending on whether one counts
1986 (+1.6) or 1990 (-1.6) as the largest error.
29Table 9
Errors in Administration and DRI Growth Forecasts, 1983-90


























































































Errors in Administration and DRI Inflation Forecasts, 1983-90


























































































Ratios of Sums of the
Administration’s Squared Growth and
Inflation Forec~tstErrors, 1976-90
Country Growth Inflation




West Germany 0.59 0.91
Italy 0.44 1.13
United Kingdom 0.55 0.64
G—7 total 0.59 0.81
32Table 12





Year Outcome Admin. OECD DRI
Blue
Chip Greenbook Admin. OECD DRI
Blue
Chip Greenbook
1976 6.0 6.2 N.A. 6.2 N.A. 5.6 0.2 N.A. 0.2 N.A. —0.4
1977 4.9 5.7 4.5 5.7 4.9 4.7 0.8 —0.4 0.8 0.0 —0.2
1978 4.8 4.3 4.2 4.9 4.9 4.7 —0.5 —0.6 0.1 0.1 —0.1
1979 2.3 3.2 2.0 2.0 2.1 3.3 0.9 —0.3 —0.3 —0.2 1.0
1980 —0.2 1.0 —1.2 0.2 0.2 —1.7 1.2 —1.0 0.4 0.4 —1.5
1981 1.9 1.4 0.8 1.4 1.1 -0.6 -0.5 -1.1 -0.5 -0.8 -2.5
1982 —1.9 3.4 —0.5 2.4 2.6 —0.6 5.3 1.4 4.3 4.5 1.3
1983 3.7 2.8 2.0 2.2 2.8 1.4 —0.9 —1.7 —1.5 —0.9 —2.3
1984 6.6 5.2 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.5 —1.4 —1.6 —1.6 —1.5 —1.1
1985 2.7 3.7 3.0 2.1 3.1 2.7 1.0 0.3 —0.6 0.4 0.0
1986 2.9 4.2 2.8 2.1 3.0 2.4 1.3 —0.1 —0.8 0.1 —0.5
1987 3.4 4.0 3.0 1.5 2.9 2.6 0.6 —0.4 —1.9 —0.5 —0.8
1988 4.4 3.3 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.3 —1.1 —1.9 —1.8 —1.5 —2.1
1989 2.5 3.1 3.0 2.7 2.4 3.3 0.6 0.5 0.2 —0.1 0.8








Year Outcome Admin. DRI [Blue Chip [Greenbook Admin. [ DRI Blue Chip Greenbook
1976 5.8 6.0 7.1 N.A. 5.6 0.2 1.3 N.A. —0.2
1977 5.8 6.5 4.9 N.A. 5.6 0.7 —0.9 N.A. —0.2
1978 7.5 6.0 5.9 N.A. 6.3 —1.5 —1.6 N.A. —1.2
1979 8.5 6.5 7.9 N.A. 7.8 —2.0 —0.6 N.A. —0.7
1980 9.0 8.4 9.6 9.3 9.4 —0.6 0.6 0.3 0.4
1981 10.4 10.3 10.4 10.2 10.6 —0.1 0.0 —0.2 0.2
1982 6.0 7.0 7.9 8.1 7.5 1.0 1.9 2.1 1.5
1983 3.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 4.6 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.4
1984 4.3 4.4 4.8 5.0 4.5 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.2
1985 3.6 4.6 3.8 4.5 4.0 1.0 0.2 0.9 0.4
1986 1.9 4.2 3.4 4.0 3.5 2.3 1.5 2.1 1.6
1987 3.7 2.8 2.9 3.2 2.4 —0.9 —0.8 —0.5 —1.3
1988 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.6 3.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 —0.8
1989 4.8 4.2 5.0 5.0 4.0 —0.6 0.2 0.2 —0.8
1990 5.4 4.2 4.1 4.4 3.8 —1.2 —1.3 —1.0 —1.6
NOTE: For 1979 and 1980, the Administration inflation forecast pertained to the GNP deflator; for all
other years, the forecast pertained to the consumer price index. Hence, 1979 and 1980 DRI









Year (Outcome Admin. OECD (DRI Admin. OECD DRI
1976 4.9 4.0 N.A. 5.9 —0.9 N.A. 1.0
1977 2.7 5.0 3.5 4.0 2.3 0.8 1.3
1978 3.4 4.2 3.8 4.6 0.8 0.4 1.2
1979 2.8 2.5 4.0 3.0 —0.3 1.2 0.2
1980 0.0 2.5 1.5 2.2 2.5 1.5 2.2
1981 3.4 1.3 1.2 1.9 —2.1 —2.2 —1.5
1982 —4.4 3.2 1.0 3.5 7.6 5.4 7.9
1983 3.3 2.1 1.2 1.7 —1.2 —2.1 —1.6
1984 5.0 4.7 5.0 5.0 —0.3 0.0 0.0
1985 4.1 3.1 2.8 2.3 —1.0 —1.2 —1.8
1986 3.0 4.4 3.0 2.7 1.4 —0.3 —0.3
1987 4.0 2.5 2.8 2.9 —1.5 —1.2 —1.1
1988 5.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 —2.0 —2.2 —2.2
1989 2.9 2.1 3.0 2.9 —0.8 0.1 0.0









Year Outcome Admin. DRI Admin. DRI
1976 7.5 10.0 9.0 2.5 1.5
1977 8.0 7.0 7.8 —1.0 —0.2
1978 9.0 6.3 6.9 —2.7 —2.1
1979 9.1 7.0 7.9 —2.1 —1.2
1980 10.2 9.0 8.8 —1.2 —1.4
1981 12.5 10.6 10.5 —1.9 —2.0
1982 10.8 11.5 10.1 0.7 —0.7
1983 5.8 7.6 7.2 1.8 1.4
1984 4.4 6.5 3.3 2.1 —1.1
1985 4.0 4.6 3.4 0.6 —0.6
1986 4.1 3.3 4.0 —0.8 —0.1
1987 4.4 3.9 4.5 —0.5 0.1
1988 4.1 4.8 5.3 0.7 1.2
1989 5.0 4.7 4.9 —0.3 —0.1
1990 4.8 4.8 4.7 0.0 —0.1
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outcomes) Outcome Forecast Error
Year J Outcome Admin. OECD Admin. OECD Admin. only
1976 6.3 4.5 N.A. —1.8 N.A. 9.3 9.5 0.2
1977 5.2 7.0 6.0 1.8 0.8 8.0 9.5 1.5
1978 5.1 6.0 5.0 0.9 —0.1 3.8 6.0 2.2
1979 5.9 6.0 4.8 0.1 —1.1 3.5 6.0 2.5
1980 4.2 4.8 4.8 0.6 0.6 8.0 8.5 0.5
1981 3.8 4.2 3.8 0.4 0.0 4.9 5.0 0.1
1982 3.3 5.1 3.8 1.8 0.5 2.7 4.1 1.4
1983 3.4 3.0 3.5 —0.4 0.1 1.9 3.3 1.4
1984 5.1 4.5 4.0 —0.6 —1.1 2.2 2.3 0.1
1985 4.7 4.7 5.0 0.0 0.3 2.0 2.9 0.9
1986 2.4 4.5 3.5 2.1 1.1 0.6 2.0 1.4
1987 4.5 2.5 2.8 —2.0 —1.7 0.1 —0.2 —0.3
1988 5.7 3.0 3.5 —2.7 —2.2 0.7 0.9 0.2
1989 4.9 3.5 4.5 —1.4 —0.4 2.3 2.6 0.3
1990 5.2 5.2 4.5 0.0 —0.7 3.1 1.6 —1.5
N.A.: Not Available
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outcomes) Outcome Forecast Error
Year Outcome Admin. OECD Admin. OECD Admin. only
1976 5.2 3.9 N.A. -1.3 N.A. 9.6 10.0 0.4
1977 3.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 0.0 9.5 6.5 —3.0
1978 3.7 3.5 3.2 —0.2 —0.5 9.1 9.0 —0.1
1979 3.3 3.2 3.5 —0.1 0.2 10.4 9.0 —1.4
1980 1.3 2.2 2.0 0.9 0.7 13.6 10.5 —3.1
1981 0.2 1.6 1.0 1.4 0.8 13.4 12.0 —1.4
1982 2.0 3.1 2.5 1.1 0.5 11.9 15.5 3.6
1983 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.0 —0.2 9.3 12.0 2.7
1984 1.9 0.9 0.0 —1.0 —1.9 7.3 7.4 0.1
1985 1.4 1.7 2.0 0.3 0.6 5.5 6.3 0.8
1986 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 5.4 2.9
1987 2.3 2.5 2.2 0.2 —0.1 3.3 2.1 —1.2
1988 3.4 1.5 1.5 —1.9 —1.9 2.7 3.1 0.4
1989 3.7 1.7 3.0 —2.0 —0.7 3.5 3.1 —0.4
1990 2.2 2.7 3.1 0.5 0.9 3.4 3.6 0.2
N.A.: Not Available
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outcomes) Outcome Forecast Error
Year Outcome Admin. OECD Admin. OECD J Admin. only
1976 5.6 3.5 N.A. —2.1 N.A. 4.5 5.0 0.5
1977 2.6 4.5 3.5 1.9 0.9 3.9 5.0 1.1
1978 3.6 3.0 3.2 —0.6 —0.4 2.8 3.5 0.7
1979 4.5 3.5 4.0 —1.0 —0.5 4.1 3.0 —1.1
1980 1.8 3.1 2.2 1.3 0.4 5.5 4.1 —1.4
1981 —0.2 0.4 —0.2 0.6 0.0 6.0 4.4 —1.6
1982 —1.1 1.1 1.2 2.2 2.3 5.3 4.0 —1.3
1983 1.3 —0.2 —0.2 —1.5 —1.5 3.3 3.9 0.6
1984 2.7 1.9 2.0 —0.8 —0.7 2.4 3.6 1.2
1985 2.5 3.8 2.8 1.3 0.3 2.2 2.5 0.3
1986 2.5 3.2 3.2 0.7 0.7 —0.2 2.1 2.3
1987 1.8 3.7 3.0 1.9 1.2 0.2 1.5 1.3
1988 3.6 1.7 1.5 —1.9 —2.1 1.3 1.9 0.6
1989 4.0 1.5 2.5 —2.5 —1.5 2.8 2.5 —0.3
1990 5.0 3.0 3.2 —2.0 —1.3 2.7 2.6 —0.1
N.A.: Not Available
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outcomes) Outcome Forecast Error
Year Outcome Admin. OECD Admin. OECD Admin. only
1976 5.6 2.9 N.A. —2.7 N.A. 16.5 11.6 —4.9
1977 1.7 2.3 —0.5 0.6 —2.2 18.1 14.0 —4.1
1978 2.7 2.0 1.0 —0.7 -1.7 12.1 8.0 —4.1
1979 5.0 3.1 3.5 —1.9 —1.5 14.8 9.0 —5.8
1980 4.0 2.3 2.0 —1.7 —2.0 21.2 14.5 —6.7
1981 —0.2 0.0 —1.0 0.2 —0.8 18.7 16.0 —2.7
1982 —0.3 1.8 1.0 2.1 1.3 16.3 17.5 1.2
1983 —1.2 1.0 0.2 2.2 1.4 15.0 14.0 —1.0
1984 2.6 2.5 2.0 —0.1 —0.6 10.6 13.5 2.9
1985 2.3 3.2 2.5 0.9 0.2 8.6 10.0 1.4
1986 2.7 2.8 2.5 0.1 —0.2 6.1 10.0 3.9
1987 3.1 3.0 3.0 —0.1 —0.1 4.6 4.6 0.0
1988 3.9 2.4 2.0 —1.5 —1.9 5.0 6.1 1.1
1989 3.2 2.7 3.5 —0.5 0.3 6.6 5.2 —1.4
1990 2.2 3.0 3.2 0.8 1.0 6.1 5.9 —0.2
N.A.: Not Available
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outcomes) Outcome Forecast Error
Year Outcome Admin. OECD Admin. OECD Admin. only
1976 2.1 2.0 N.A. —0.1 N.A. 16.5 16.0 0.5
1977 1.8 3.9 1.5 2.1 —0.3 15.8 11.0 —4.8
1978 3.6 3.0 3.0 —0.6 —0.6 8.3 13.0 4.7
1979 1.5 2.5 2.2 1.0 0.7 13.4 9.6 —3.8
1980 —2.8 —1.2 —2.0 1.6 0.8 18.0 14.5 —3.5
1981 —2.4 —0.9 —2.0 1.5 0.4 11.8 13.0 1.2
1982 1.5 2.3 0.2 0.8 —1.3 8.6 10.2 1.6
1983 3.3 1.8 1.0 —1.5 —2.3 4.6 5.3 0.7
1984 1.8 2.3 2.2 0.5 0.4 5.0 5.8 0.8
1985 3.6 3.0 3.0 —0.6 —0.6 6.1 5.9 —0.2
1986 3.0 2.8 2.2 —0.2 —0.8 3.4 5.0 1.6
1987 4.2 2.2 2.8 —2.0 —1.4 4.1 4.1 0.0
1988 4.2 2.5 2.8 —1.7 —1.4 4.9 4.4 —0.5
1989 2.3 2.2 3.0 —0.1 0.7 7.8 4.6 —3.2
1990 1.0 1.8 1.3 0.8 0.3 9.5 6.0 —3.5
N.A.: Not Available
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